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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING, 
Defendant/Appellant« 
Case No. 920186-CA 
Priority No. 3 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The following points are submitted by Appellant Steven 
Stilling ("Stilling")in reply to the arguments presented in the 
State7s responsive brief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH SUPREME COURTS RECENT DECISION IN WTT.T.TgTT y, BARNES 
IS DISPOSITIVE OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED BY THIS APPEAL. 
The fundamental issue presented by this appeal is whether the 
trial court substantially complied with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure ("Rule 11") and other applicable law in 
accepting the guilty pleas of Stilling.1 On October 28, 1992, the 
Utah Supreme Court issued an opinion which directly addresses the 
issue of what is required of the trial court in accepting a guilty 
plea. Willett v. Barnes, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1992). The trial 
court's actions in this case fail to comply with Willett. 
1
 Stilling entered his pleas of guilty pursuant to North 
Carolina v. Alford. 400 U.S. 25 (1970), which allowed Stilling to 
maintain his innocence while pleading guilty in order to accept a 
favorable plea bargain. 
In Willett, the appellant sought to withdraw his plea of 
guilty to a charge of first degree murder on the grounds that, 
among other things, the trial court failed to establish a factual 
basis for the plea. Id. Addressing the appellant's claim, the 
Supreme Court stated: 
This court's decision in State v. Breckenridae. 688 
P.2d P. 2d 440 (Utah 1983), established that before 
accepting a guilty plea, a trial court must develop a 
factual basis upon which to base a conviction of the 
charged crime. In Breckenridae, we concluded that even 
though the plea colloquy did include a recitation of 
surrounding facts, as a matter of law those facts were 
insufficient to support the charge. Id. at 442-44. In 
this case, the colloquy contains no recitation of any 
facts surrounding the death of the victim. We therefore 
conclude that the plea colloquy failed to develop the 
factual basis necessary for the court to properly accept 
Willett's plea. 
On appeal, the State contends, however, as the 
district court concluded, that the "record as a whole" 
established a sufficient factual basis to accept the 
guilty plea, even if the plea hearing did not. Willett#s 
plea occurred before our decision in State* v. Gibbons, 
740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), and the ore-Gibbons rule 
required reviewing courts to uphold guilty pleas as long 
as the record as a whole demonstrated "substantial 
compliance" with constitutional and procedural 
requirements. State v. Hoff. 814 P.2d 1119, 1123-24 
(Utah 1991). 
Applying the substantial compliance test, we 
conclude the court below erred. In the entire* record, 
nothing supports a finding that an adequate* factual basis 
existed at the time Willett entered his plea. The State 
has not adverted to any facts regarding the events 
themselves that could form the basis of a conviction. 
The closest cinything in the record comes to establishing 
a factual basis is a brief colloquy, prompted by Mr. 
Watson, a deputy county attorney, during the entry of 
Harley Willett's guilty plea on the second degree murder 
charge: 
MR WATSON: Perhaps the court would want to inquire 
whether or not there is a factual basis from this 
particular defendant with regard to the entry of 
this plea Your Honor. 
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THE COURT: Suppose you state for the court briefly 
Mr. Willett how exactly it happened on the 20th of 
November? 
MR. HARLEY WILLETT: Well, I aided and abetted my 
father. 
THE COURT: In doing what? 
MR. HARLEY WILLETT: In the commission of killing 
Mr. Dan Okleberry. 
THE COURT: I suppose that is adequate Mr. Watson. 
The court then accepted Harley Willett#s plea. Yet 
Harley Willett's statement of "how exactly it happened" 
is merely a legal conclusion, parroting the statutory 
elements of the crime charged against him. Whether or 
not it established an adequate factual basis for Harley 
Willett's plea, it certainly did not validate the guilty 
plea that Duane Willett has already entered. We thus 
reverse the district court's conclusion"[t]hat a factual 
basis for the charge made against the defendant is 
evident from the record, even though not succinctly 
stated by or to the Court." [Emphasis added]. 
The district court also upheld the validity of Duane 
Willett's plea on a finding "[t]hat although he knew in 
his own mind that he was not guilty . . . , he wanted to 
save his son from any jeopardy to the death penalty." To 
the extent the court treated this finding as a sufficient 
factual basis to uphold the plea as intelligently and 
voluntarily made, it misread Breckenridge. In 
Breckenridae. we suggested that a valid guilty plea 
required a "record of facts" showing either "that the 
charged crime was actually committed by the defendant, or 
that the defendant has for some other legitimate reason 
intelligently and voluntarily entered such a plea." 688 
P.2d at 440. But by "record of facts" showing some other 
legitimate reason for the plea, we meant facts that would 
substantiate the prosecution of the charge at trial, not 
merely facts establishing the defendant's motivation for 
entering the plea. 
Breckenridae cited North Carolina v. Alfordr 400 
U.S. 25 (1970), as an example of other legitimate reasons 
for pleading guilty. In Alford, the defendant maintained 
his innocence yet pleaded guilty because he acknowledged 
the strength of the state's case against him and because 
by pleading guilty, he avoided risking the death penalty. 
Id. at 27-29. In denying Willett's petitions, the 
district court below similarly concluded that Willett 
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believed he had a legitimate reason to plead guilty 
because he desired to spare his son the risk of the death 
penalty and he therefore entered his pleei intelligently 
and voluntarily. But in Alford, the record before the 
trial court documented facts establishing the strength of 
the state's case, facts that would have placed the 
defendant at a serious risk of conviction had he 
proceeded to trial. Id. Critically, in Willett's case 
the record reveals no facts that would support the 
prosecution of the charge or suggest that either Duane 
Willett or Harley Willett faced a substantial risk of 
conviction at trial. A court cannot be satisfied that a 
guilty plea is knowing and voluntary unless the record 
establishes facts that would place the defendamt at risk 
of conviction should the matter proceed to trial. 
Therefore, Alford is inapposite, and the factual basis 
requirement of Breckenridae remains unsatisfied. 
Id. at 3-4. 
As in Willett, nothing in the record at the time Stilling 
entered his pleas provides a sufficient factual basis for the trial 
court's acceptance of his pleas. As the State recognizes in its 
brief, the only part of the record that provided any factual basis 
for the pleas was the expiation agreement (a copy of which is 
attached to the State's brief as appendix 4). See, State's Brief 
at pp. 19-25. As even the most cursory review of the expiation 
agreement reveals, the expiation agreement fails to set forth any 
facts that would support the prosecution of the charges against 
Stilling or suggest that Stilling faced a substantial risk of 
conviction at trial. Accordingly, as recognized in Willett, the 
original trial court could not be satisfied that Stilling's guilty 
pleas were knowing and voluntary and the second trial court erred 
in denying Stilling's motion to withdraw his pleas, after having 
found that the record in 1985 involving the taking of the guilty 
pleas was not in substantial compliance with Rule 11. R. 159. 
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II. THE COURT SHOULD RESPECT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OP LACK OF 
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 11. 
In its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law denying 
Stilling's motion to withdraw his pleas (attached to Stilling's 
opening brief as addendum C)/ the trial court specifically found as 
follows: 
If the court were to rely only on the record as it 
existed at the time of the pleas
 # that record would be 
insufficient to establish substantial compliance with 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11. 
R. 159. 
The State now attempts to categorize this critical finding by 
the trial court as a "subsidiary ruling" and, despite have failed 
to appeal the trial court's ruling, asks the Court to declare that 
it was error. State's Brief at p. 15. The Court should not do so. 
If the State did not agree with the trial court's ruling, it 
should have filed a cross-appeal. The State argues that because it 
got the outcome it wanted, it was "disinclined to appeal any error 
made en route to the ultimate outcome." State's Brief at p. 15. n. 
4. This argument would have been valid had Stilling not appealed 
the trial court's decision. Stilling, however, filed a timely 
appeal of the trial court's ruling. Thus, the entire matter was 
put before the Court and any disinclination on the State's part to 
appeal a "subsidiary ruling" was removed. If the State believed 
that the trial court had erred in finding a lack of "substantial 
compliance" at the time of taking the pleas, it should have filed 
a notice of cross-appeal within fourteen (14) days of Stilling's 
notice of appeal. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4. Having 
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failed to do so, the State is forever barred from having the trial 
court's finding reviewed by this or any other court. 
Should the Court choose to give consideration to the State's 
improper appeal of the trial court's lack of substantial compliance 
ruling, it must find that trial court's ruling was correct. As 
discussed more fully above, the Supreme Court's decision in Willett 
requires that at the time Stilling's pleas were accepted by the 
original trial court. the record contain facts that would support 
the prosecution of the charges or suggest that Stilling faced a 
substantial risk of conviction at trial. Willett, 199 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 3-4. As recognized by the trial court and as all but 
conceded by the State, the record at the time Stilling entered his 
pleas did not contain such facts. Thus, the trial court's so-
called "subsidiary ruling11 was not error. Rather, it was a well 
founded recognition of the law. 
III. THE AFFIDAVIT OF STILLING'S FORMER COUNSEL SHOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN CONSIDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
Although the Court can decide this case on Willett alone, it 
could give guidance to the trial court by addressing the propriety 
or legality of the affidavit of Stilling's former counsel which was 
submitted by the State over six years after the pleas were entered. 
That affidavit was the sole ground upon which the trial court 
denied Stilling's motion to withdraw his pleas and is the only 
entry in any of the records that could provide even the slightest 
compliance with Rule 11. This affidavit, however, is a violation 
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of the most inviolable of privileges and should never have found 
its way into any record. 
The law has long recognized the absolute need for an attorney-
client privilege. 
The purpose of the privilege is to encourage clients to 
make full disclosure to their attorneys. . . [I]f the 
client knows that damaging information could more readily 
be obtained from the attorney following disclosure them 
from himself in the absence of disclosure, the client 
would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would 
be difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice. 
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976). 
"The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy 
depends upon the lawyer being fully informed by the client." 
Upiohn Company v. United States. 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
In Utah, the legislature recognized the sanctity of the 
privilege when it enacted Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8 which provides 
in pertinent part: 
There are particular relations in which it is the 
policy of the law to encourage confidence and to preserve 
it inviolate. Therefore, a person cannot be examined as 
a witness in the following cases: 
(2) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his 
client, be examined as to any communication made by his 
client to him, or his advice given therein, in the course 
of professional employment; nor can an attorney's 
secretary, stenographer or clerk be examined, without the 
consent of his employer, concerning any fact, the 
knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-26(5) further provides that it is the duty 
and obligation of an attorney to "maintain inviolate the 
confidences, and at every peril to himself to pursue the secrets of 
his client." Finally, Utah Rule of Evidence 504 provides that: 
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A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to 
prevent any other person from disclosing confidential 
communications made for the purpose of facilitating the 
rendition of professional legal services to the client 
between the client and the client's representatives, 
lawyers, lawyer's representatives, and lawyers 
representing others in matters of common interest • . . 
The State, the trial court, and, most egregiously, Stilling#s 
former attorney all ignored Stilling's privilege to keep secret 
discussions between he and his former counsel and acted to violate 
Rules 1.62 and 1.93 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct* 
2
 Rule 1.6 provides: 
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating 
to representation of a client except as stated in 
paragraph (b), unless the client consents after 
disclosure. 
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the 
extent the lawyer believes necessary: 
(1) To prevent the client from committing a 
crimincil or fraudulent act that the lawyer believes 
is lik€ily to result in death of substantial bodily 
harm, or substantial injury to the financial 
interest or property of another; 
(2) To rectify the consequences of a client's 
criminal or fraudulent act in the commission of 
which the lawyer's services had been used; 
(3) To establish a claim or defense on behalf 
of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer 
and the client or to establish a defense to a 
criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer 
based upon conduct in which the client was 
involved; or 
(4) To comply with the Rules of Professional 
Conduct or other law. 
3
 Rule 1.9 provides: 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a 
matter shall not thereafter: 
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The affidavit of Stilling#s former counsel describes 
discussions which occurred between Stilling and him concerning the 
alleged crimes as well the legal strategy pursued in defending 
Stilling. It is exactly this type of communication which the 
privilege seeks to protect. See, Utah Rule of Evidence 504. 
Stilling had and continues to have the right to prevent such 
communications from being disclosed and, as such, his former 
counsel's affidavit should never have been submitted to or 
considered by the trial court. 
In an attempt to support the obvious violation of the 
attorney-client privilege, the State advances the argument that 
Stilling has claimed ineffectiveness of counsel and, in so doing, 
has waived the privilege. This argument is wholly unfounded. 
Stilling never intended to assert any claim of ineffectiveness of 
counsel and, as recognized by the State, Stilling's counsel made 
this point clear in the trial court.4 State's Brief at pp. 31-32. 
The only matter before the trial court was Stilling's motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas based upon a lack of substantial 
(a) Represent another person in the same or a 
substantially factually related matter in which 
that person's interests are materially adverse to 
the interests of the former client consents after 
consultation; or 
(b) Use information relating to the 
representation to the disadvantage of the former 
client except as Rule 1.6 would permit with respect 
to a client or when the information has become 
generally known. 
4
 In so stating, Stilling specifically reserves any claims he 
may have against his former attorney based on that attorney's 
blatant violation of the attorney-client privilege. 
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compliance with Rule 11. Accordingly, the State's reliance on Utah 
Rule of Evidence 504(d) and Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 
1.6(b)(3) is clearly misplaced. The language of these exceptions 
makes it clear that they only apply to disputes regarding the 
quality or nature of an attorney's representation of a client. 
They are of no matter where there is only a dispute as to the trial 
court's compliance with the law. 
Inasmuch as the affidavit served as the sole basis for the 
trial court's denial of Stilling's motion, the trial court's ruling 
was clearly in €*rror and must be reversed by the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The original trial court failed to even substeintially comply 
with Rule 11 when it accepted Stilling's guilty pleas. The record 
at the time the pleas were accepted contained no facts that 
supported the prosecution of the charges or suggested that Stilling 
faced a substantial risk of conviction should the matter proceed to 
trial. The only facts in any of the records which would support 
acceptance of the guilty pleas are found in the post-plea affidavit 
of Stilling's former counsel. This affidavit undeniably violates 
the attorney-client privilege and should never hcive been submitted 
to or considered by the trial court. For these reasons, the Court 
should reverse the trial court's denial of Stilling's motion to 
withdraw his pleas and remand the case for further proceedings upon 
Stilling's plea of not guilty to the original charges. As the 
Supreme Court recognized in Willett, "[n]o legitimate interest of 
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the state can be served by the continued incarceration of a man on 
the strength of a guilty plea that does not satisfy the 
requirements of the law." 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of December, 1992. 
HALEY & STOLEBARGER 
Jo Ca^l/NfessetySale 
Greggory J. Layxon 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 4th day of December, 1992, four 
(4) true and correct copies of the foregoing brief were mailed to 
R. Paul Van Dam, Utah Attorney General, J. Kevin Murphy, Assistant 
Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
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